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DISCUSSION PAPER 2011-04  |  MAY 2011The  Hamilton  Project  seeks  to  advance  America’s  promise  of 
opportunity,  prosperity,  and  growth.  The  Project’s  economic 
strategy  reflects  a  judgment  that  long-term  prosperity  is  best 
achieved by fostering economic growth and broad participation 
in that growth, by enhancing individual economic security, and by 
embracing a role for effective government in making needed public 
investments.  We  believe  that  today’s  increasingly  competitive 
global economy requires public policy ideas commensurate with 
the challenges of the 21st Century. Our strategy calls for combining 
increased public investments in key growth-enhancing areas, a 
secure social safety net, and fiscal discipline. In that framework, 
the  Project  puts  forward  innovative  proposals  from  leading 
economic thinkers — based on credible evidence and experience, 
not  ideology  or  doctrine  to  introduce  new  and  effective  policy 
options into the national debate. 
The  Project  is  named  after  Alexander  Hamilton,  the  nation’s 
first treasury secretary, who laid the foundation for the modern 
American  economy.  Consistent  with  the  guiding  principles  of 
the  Project,  Hamilton  stood  for  sound  fiscal  policy,  believed 
that  broad-based  opportunity  for  advancement  would  drive 
American economic growth, and recognized that “prudent aids 
and encouragements on the part of government” are necessary to 
enhance and guide market forces. 
MISSION STATEMENTThe Hamilton Project  •  Brookings   1
Promoting Clean Energy  
in the American Power Sector
Joseph E. Aldy
John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University 
Resources for the Future 
National Bureau of Economic Research
MAY 2011
NOTE: This discussion paper is a proposal from the author. As emphasized in The Hamilton Project’s 
original strategy paper, the Project was designed in part to provide a forum for leading thinkers across the 
nation to put forward innovative and potentially important economic policy ideas that share the Project’s 
broad goals of promoting economic growth, broad-based participation in growth, and economic security. 
The authors are invited to express their own ideas in discussion papers, whether or not the Project’s staff or 
advisory council agrees with the specific proposals. This discussion paper is offered in that spirit.2   Promoting Clean Energy in the American Power Sector
Abstract
Despite bipartisan interest in advancing American energy policy, comprehensive energy and climate legislation fell short in the 
Senate last year after passing in the House of Representatives in 2009. The difficulty of coming to broad agreement highlights the 
need for a more targeted and incremental approach. One promising intermediate step would be a technology-neutral national 
clean energy standard that applies to the U.S. power sector. This paper proposes a standard that would lower carbon dioxide 
emissions by as much as 60 percent relative to 2005 levels over twenty years, streamline the fragmented regulatory system 
that is currently in place, generate fiscal benefits, and help fund energy innovation. Through a simple design and transparent 
implementation, the National Clean Energy Standard would provide certainty about the economic returns to clean energy that 
would facilitate investment in new energy projects and lower the emission intensity of the power sector. It would also serve as an 
ambitious bridge to economy-wide energy and climate policy.The Hamilton Project  •  Brookings   3
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at a cost that is justified by its benefits. Well-designed policy 
requiring new legislation is necessary.
A preferred energy policy should deliver an array of benefits, 
including reducing the fiscal burden of the energy system, 
promoting  investment  that  has  been  inhibited  by  policy 
uncertainty,  streamlining  the  regulatory  landscape,  and 
improving  the  global  environment.  A  first-best  policy  to 
deliver these objectives would be an economy-wide carbon tax 
that could finance energy research and development (R&D), 
tax cuts, and deficit reduction, and replace the existing and 
potentially complex state and federal regulatory systems.
Given  the  current  political  challenge  in  advancing  such  a 
first-best policy, I propose a National Clean Energy Standard 
(NCES) for the U.S. power sector. The principles of simplicity, 
cost-effectiveness, and price certainty guided the design for 
the proposed standard that should make meaningful progress 
on these policy objectives. The key details of the NCES include
•    A technology-neutral performance metric. My definition 
of clean energy is based on the CO2 emission intensity of 
power generation. The lower the intensity, the cleaner the 
power.  This  avoids  the  challenge  of  picking  technology 
winners that could risk inhibiting future innovation, and 
makes the assessment of progress transparent and simple.
•    Performance goals. The share of power generated by clean 
energy technologies would increase over time, reflecting 
a  carbon  emission  performance  standard  for  the  power 
sector  that  becomes  more  stringent  through  2035.  The 
initial performance goal in 2015 is 0.4 tons of CO2 per 
megawatt hour of generation (tCO2/MWh), which would 
require meaningful improvement from the 2010 emission 
Introduction
T
he  general  public  and  their  representatives  in 
Washington from both sides of the political aisle agree 
that the United States should advance a more sensible 
energy policy. Under the status quo, the U.S. power sector is 
characterized by dirty power and a complex and potentially 
costly regulatory environment. The U.S. power sector emits 
more  carbon  dioxide  (CO2)  than  any  other  country  in  the 
world except China. Continuing climate science scholarship 
highlights the need to take action to mitigate the risk posed by 
greenhouse gas emissions. Deploying clean energy in the power 
sector can contribute to the global effort to combat climate 
change  while  providing  demand  for  domestic  natural  gas 
production and manufacturing and construction associated 
with new zero-emission power facilities, including renewables 
and nuclear.
About  thirty  states  have  some  form  of  renewable  or  clean 
energy  mandate  in  their  power  sectors.  This  illustrates 
significant interest across the country—in both blue and red 
states—to promote clean energy. In the past year, interest in 
taking a more expansive approach to promoting clean energy 
has  been  evident  from  both  Democrats  and  Republicans: 
Senators  Lugar,  Graham,  and  Murkowski  supported  a  bill 
with  a  “diverse  energy  standard”  (S.  3464)  and  President 
Obama called for a clean energy standard.1 
A national policy could lower bureaucratic burdens of the state 
regulatory patchwork for those operating in multiple states 
and deliver societal goals in a more cost-effective manner. 
Layered on top of this is the prospect for federal greenhouse 
gas regulations under the Clean Air Act. This Clean Air Act 
authority is unlikely to result in an approach that effectively 
promotes clean energy and lowers greenhouse gas emissions 
The principles of simplicity, cost-effectiveness, and price certainty  
guided the design for the proposed standard that should make 
meaningful progress on key energy policy objectives.6   Promoting Clean Energy in the American Power Sector
intensity of generation of 0.56. This 2015 goal of 0.4 tCO2/
MWh roughly corresponds to a 60 percent clean energy 
portfolio standard. The performance goal would tighten 
by 0.01 tCO2/MWh each year until reaching 0.2 in 2035, 
approximately equal to an 80 percent clean energy portfolio.
•    Clean  energy  credits.  A  power  producer  that  beats  the 
performance goal can create tradable “clean energy credits” 
that it may sell to utilities that fail to meet the goal. This 
would promote cost-effective deployment of clean energy 
in the power sector. Each credit is denominated in terms of 
a ton of CO2.
•    Compliance. A utility may demonstrate compliance with 
the  policy  through  a  combination  of  approaches.  First, 
it  may  reduce  the  intensity  of  its  generation  below  the 
performance goal. Second, it may purchase clean energy 
credits from other utilities such that its performance and 
purchased credits meet the goal. Third, it may purchase 
federal clean energy credits that are available at a preset 
price,  such  that  these  in  combination  with  privately 
generated credits and the utility’s own performance meet 
the goal. In 2015, the price for these credits will be $15, and 
it will ramp up 7 percent annually, reaching $30 per credit 
by 2025. The federal clean energy credit prices are expected 
to bind on the clean energy credit market, which would 
provide price certainty to promote and improve investment 
decisions and provide a guarantee against unexpectedly 
high prices. Over the first ten years of the program, the 
price  would  average  $21/MWh  per  credit,  which  would 
deliver the same value to wind and many other renewable 
producers as they enjoy today through the production tax 
credit, without the fiscal outlay.
•    Clean Energy Fund. Revenues raised through the federal 
clean energy  credit  would finance a  ramp-up in  energy 
R&D. I propose dedicating $2 billion of revenues in 2015 
to the fund, and ramping this up over time to $5 billion 
in 2025. The fund should support merit-based, competitive 
research, such as through the Advanced Research Projects 
Agency–Energy (ARPA-E), and could also support first-of-
a-kind demonstration projects as outlined in Deutch (2011) 
as well as other energy R&D programs. Any excess revenues 
beyond  this  would  be  dedicated  to  deficit  reduction  or 
reducing current tax rates, such as the payroll tax rate.
•    Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Greenhouse Gas 
Regulatory Authority and State Renewable Mandates. The 
NCES would eliminate the need for EPA regulations of 
greenhouse gas emissions in the power sector, and the need 
for  significantly  duplicative  state  renewable  mandates. 
Legislation creating a NCES should strike EPA greenhouse 
gas regulatory authority in the power sector and preempt 
state renewable and alternative energy portfolio standards.
The federal clean energy credit prices... would provide price 
certainty to promote and improve investment decisions and 
provide a guarantee against unexpectedly high prices.The Hamilton Project  •  Brookings   7
Chapter 1: Reliance on Dirty Power
A 
by-product of America’s reliance on power produced 
from  relatively  dirty  fuel  is  relatively  high  carbon 
emissions. On average, a megawatt hour of electricity 
generated in the United States today results in emissions of 
about 0.56 metric tons of CO2. Whereas the evolving mix of 
power  generation  technologies  has  resulted  in  a  declining 
emission intensity of electricity in the post-war period (Figure 
1),  it  remains  well  above  the  intensities  of  Japan  and  the 
European Union.
The modest reduction in the emission intensity of the power 
sector over time reflects both improvements in combustion 
efficiency and changes in the fuel mix. Emission intensity of 
power generation varies significantly across technologies and 
fuels. Natural gas produces less than half as much carbon 
pollution per unit of electricity generated as does coal, and 
nuclear and renewable sources have zero CO2 emissions (Table 
1).2  Within a given type of fossil fuel power plant, emission 
intensity can vary with the facility’s combustion efficiency and 
fuel characteristics. Successful commercialization of carbon 
capture and storage technologies could dramatically alter the 
emission profiles for fossil fuel–based generation technologies.
FIGURE 1 
U.S. Electricity Generation Carbon Dioxide Emission Intensity, 1949–2010
Source: Constructed from data presented in EIA (2010a, 2011b).
Note: The 2010 emission intensity is estimated based on 2010 fuel shares and 2009 emission intensities by type of generation.8   Promoting Clean Energy in the American Power Sector
Coal has served as the leading source of power in the United 
States since World War II, ranging between about 44 and 57 
percent of U.S. power generation (Figure 2), although its share 
of power generation in 2009 and 2010 was lower than at any 
point since the late 1970s. The other primary baseload power 
source, nuclear, experienced an increase in its share of power 
generation in the 1970s as new power plants came online. 
Nuclear has represented about one-fifth of U.S. power over the 
past two decades.
Refined petroleum products, primarily residual fuel, distillate 
fuel, and petroleum coke once comprised a meaningful share 
of U.S. power generation. At the time of the first oil shock in 
1973, oil-fired power plants generated 17 percent of U.S. power 
and represented about 10 percent of U.S. oil consumption. By 
2010, oil produced less than 1 percent of U.S. generation; the 
total number of barrels of oil consumed by the power sector 
has fallen 90 percent since 1973. Given oil’s very small share 
of generation today, the environmental and energy security 
benefits of further efforts to back oil out of the power sector 
are quite modest.3 
The  share  of  power  from  natural  gas  plants  has  varied 
significantly since 1949. In 1970, nearly one-quarter of U.S. 
electricity came from gas-fired plants. By 1990, the gas share 
of power generation had fallen to about 10 percent, but has 
since rebounded to exceed 20 percent over the past four years. 
The gas share of generation in 2010 was the highest it has been 
since 1971.
Renewable  power,  primarily  through  hydroelectric  dams, 
delivered more than 20 percent of U.S. power in the 1950s, 
but  hydroelectric’s  share  has  declined  because  of  limited 
investment in dams since then. Other renewable generation 
sources, including wind, solar, geothermal, and biomass, made 
up no more than about 1 to 1.5 percent of power generation in 
the 1990s. The share of other renewables doubled from 2006 to 
2010, and is now about 3.5 percent.
TABLE 1
Average Carbon Dioxide Emission Intensity by Generation Type, 2009, tCO2/MWh
Coal  Oil  Natural Gas  Nuclear  Hydroelectric  Other renewables
0.99  0.95  0.44  0  0  0
Source: Constructed from data presented in EIA (2010a).
Source: Constructed from data presented in EIA (2010a, 2011b).
FIGURE 2
Share of U.S. Electricity Generation by Type, 1949–2010The Hamilton Project  •  Brookings   9
The  shift  toward  natural  gas  and  renewable  power  had  a 
material  impact  on  U.S.  power  sector  carbon  emissions  in 
2009, in addition to the effect of declining demand resulting 
from lower economic activity. If the share of power generated 
from coal, natural gas, and oil did not change from 2008 to 
2009, then electricity sector CO2 emissions would have been 
about 5 percent higher (about 100 million metric tons higher) 
than they were in 2009.
The increase in power generation from natural gas and other 
renewables reflects the substantial increase in investment in 
generating capacity over the past two decades. During the 
period  1990–2008,  total  U.S.  generating  capacity  increased 
by about 276 gigawatts, representing growth of more than 37 
percent (Table 2). Coal-generating capacity changed by only 
6 gigawatts, or about 2 percent of the growth in capacity. In 
contrast,  natural  gas  capacity  increased  by  more  than  250 
gigawatts and made up about 92 percent of the growth in total 
capacity. Other renewable capacity has increased significantly, 
especially in recent years. By 2010, wind capacity exceeded 
40 gigawatts (American Wind Energy Association [AWEA] 
2011).
Nameplate-generating  capacity  does  not  correspond  one-
to-one to power generation. Some power plant technologies 
are  intended  for  baseload,  while  some  are  intended  to 
provide power during peak periods of demand. In addition, 
intermittent  sources,  such  as  solar  and  wind,  produce  less 
power  per  megawatt  of  installed  capacity  than  baseload 
coal  and  nuclear.  The  Energy  Information  Administration 
(EIA 2011a) published estimates of capacity factors for new 
generating capacity that could come online within five years 
(Table 3). These estimates show that a megawatt of capacity of 
combined-cycle natural gas, in contrast to combustion turbine 
natural gas plants built primarily to meet peak demand, can 
compete with a megawatt of coal or nuclear in serving a given 
base demand.
About two-thirds of the new natural gas–generating capacity 
to come online since 1990 is combined cycle, but high natural 
gas prices over 2000–2008 limited its use (Kaplan 2010). For 
example, only 13 percent of the combined-cycle natural gas 
plants in operation in 2007 had capacity factors that exceeded 
70 percent. The average capacity factor for coal in 2007 was 75 
percent, significantly higher than the average capacity factor 
of  42  percent  for  combined-cycle  natural  gas  in  that  year 
(Kaplan 2010). 
TABLE 2 
U.S. Electricity Summer Generating Capacity, Gigawatts, 1990 and 2008
Type  1990  2008
Total  734  1,010
Coal  307  313
Natural gas  141  397
Other renewable  2  25
Source: Constructed from data presented in EIA (2010a).
Note: Other fuels experienced modest changes from their 1990 levels, with the exception of oil-fired capacity, which declined about 20 gigawatts.
TABLE 3
Estimated Capacity Factor of New Generating Capacity for 2016
   Conventional   Combined-  Advanced  Wind  Solar  Geothermal
   coal  cycle natural gas  nuclear
 
   85%  87%  90%  34%  18–25%  92%
Source: EIA (2011a).
Note: Solar range represents solar thermal (18 percent) and solar PV (25 percent).10   Promoting Clean Energy in the American Power Sector
The  recent  increase  in  power  generation  from  natural  gas 
plants since 2008 represents increasing utilization of existing 
facilities.
Given the forecast for slow growth in electricity demand (less 
than 1 percent per year through 2035) and the existing surplus 
of  natural  gas–fired  generation  capacity,  the  EIA  (2011a) 
forecasts modest investment in new power plant capacity over 
the next two decades. Through 2030, cumulative electricity 
capacity investments are forecast to total about 125 gigawatts 
to  meet  slightly  higher  demand  and  offset  retirements  of 
about 35 gigawatts of capacity. The mix in power generation is 
expected to evolve slowly, with a modest increase in renewable 
and  natural  gas  over  time,  and  a  slightly  lower  emission 
intensity of generation over the next several decades (Figure 3).
Source: Constructed from EIA (2011a).
FIGURE 3
Forecast Power Generation Shares and Carbon Dioxide Emission Intensity, 2011–2035The Hamilton Project  •  Brookings   11
...a well-designed clean energy policy should 
deliver transparent, stable incentives that 
investors can use as the basis for structuring 
financing for new power generation projects.
Chapter 2: Detailed Proposal
A 
well-designed  policy  to  promote  the  deployment  of 
clean  energy  in  the  power  sector  can  help  address 
fiscal  challenges,  encourage  investment,  streamline 
the regulatory landscape, and provide environmental benefits.
OBJECTIVES
Delivering fiscal benefits.  A  clean  energy  standard  creates 
demand-side incentives for clean energy that may substitute 
for  the  current  supply-side  subsidies  through  tax  credits 
and grants. This would enable legislators to allocate future 
resources  to  energy  programs  that  complement  the  clean 
energy standard (such as R&D on basic energy sciences), to 
other socially desired policies, or deficit reduction in lieu of 
clean energy deployment subsidies. A clean energy standard 
can also generate revenues that could be used to finance energy 
R&D as well as to reduce the deficit or finance reductions in 
existing tax rates.
Promoting investment. A clean energy standard would reduce 
the regulatory uncertainty that could be chilling investment 
in  the  power  sector.  This  uncertainty  takes  two  forms. 
First,  power  companies  face  uncertainty  over  the  general 
regulatory framework. Second, some regulatory approaches 
are  characterized  by  more  uncertainty  than  others  from 
the  perspective  of  those  making  investment  decisions.  For 
example, moving forward with power sector regulations under 
the Clean Air Act could address the first form of uncertainty, 
but may not address the latter form because of the prospect 
of  extended  litigation  (presuming  the  regulations  survive 
congressional review) and potential variation and uncertainty 
in state implementation programs. Moreover, a well-designed 
clean  energy  policy  should  deliver  transparent,  stable 
incentives that investors can use as the basis for structuring 
financing for new power generation projects.
Streamlining  regulatory  landscape.  In  addition  to 
resolving  investment  uncertainty  regarding  the  form  and 
implementation of federal policy, a clean energy standard can 
establish a single national standard to replace the various state 
renewable and clean energy mandates. Given the significant 
variation in the design and implementation of state mandates 
and the prospect of EPA greenhouse gas regulation, a single, 
streamlined federal clean energy policy can reduce regulatory 
complexity  and  promote  clean  energy  deployment  cost-
effectively.
Improving the global environment. Finally, a clean energy 
standard  can  drive  investment  and  energy  deployment 
decisions that will lower U.S. power sector greenhouse gas 
emissions and represent a meaningful step in combating the 
risks of climate change.
PRINCIPLES
In order to realize these policy objectives, three key principles 
should guide the design of a clean energy standard: simplicity, 
cost-effectiveness, and price certainty.
Simplicity. Clean energy can be defined along a variety of 
dimensions, such as its effects on air pollution, water pollution, 
toxics,  resource  throughput,  solid  and  hazardous  waste, 
greenhouse  gas  emissions;  alternatively,  it  can  be  defined 
by  some  predetermined  categorization  of  technologies.  A 
complex set of measures characterizing how “clean” a given 
energy  source  may  be  could  create  regulatory  confusion 
and inhibit investment. A predetermined class of qualifying 
technologies could inhibit innovation. 
A  simple,  transparent  policy  would 
minimize  the  risk  of  a  bumpy  and 
costly start-up to the program.
Cost-effectiveness.  The  mandate 
should be implemented in a way that 
promotes deployment of clean energy 
technologies at the lowest possible cost.12   Promoting Clean Energy in the American Power Sector
Price  certainty.  Investment  in  energy  technologies  is 
enhanced when project developers have a higher degree of 
certainty regarding the costs and benefits of their investment. 
Price certainty can also mitigate the risk of unexpectedly and 
excessively high costs to electricity producers and consumers.
POLICY DESIGN
Given these objectives and principles, an NCES should take 
the following form.
Technology-neutral  metric.  The  proposed  NCES  would 
evaluate  performance  based  on  the  emission  intensity  of 
power measured by the tons of CO2 per megawatt hour of 
generation. The lower the emission intensity of generation, the 
cleaner the technology.
An  emission  intensity-based  standard  has  several  virtues. 
First, it is a simple metric that is based on tons of CO2 and 
megawatt hours of generation, two measures that are already 
monitored at and reported by U.S. power plants. Second, it 
focuses  on  the  environmental  impact  of  power  generation 
that has not been subject to any regulatory policy, in contrast 
to  conventional  air  pollution,  water  pollution,  and  so  on. 
Third, there is a rough correlation between greenhouse gas 
emissions and other “dirty” attributes of power generation 
by fuel source. Thus, greenhouse gas emissions may serve as a 
proxy for these other attributes. Fourth, a technology-neutral 
approach provides incentives to all power plant operators to 
seek out and exploit low-cost ways to clean up their generating 
capacity. It does not rule out any class of technologies, as a 
renewable  energy  standard  would,  and  thus  it  avoids  the 
problem  of  the  government  choosing  winners.  The  private 
sector,  through  its  innovation  and  commercialization  of 
technologies  and  processes,  will  identify  the  winners.  A 
technology-neutral  approach  also  avoids  the  challenge  of 
evaluating new technologies that may not cleanly fit within a 
previously established classification scheme. A new technology 
simply demonstrates its “cleanliness” in terms of the emission 
intensity of its generation.
Performance  goals.  To  ensure  that  the  share  of  power 
generated by clean energy technologies increases and the power 
sector produces lower CO2 emissions over time, performance 
goals should be set to drive investment and deployment of 
these  technologies.  Given  the  2010  U.S.  emission  intensity 
of generation of about 0.56 tons of CO2 per megawatt hour 
and the near-term forecast for modest improvement in this 
measure over the next five years to reach about 0.53 tCO2/
MWh, this proposal calls for a performance standard of 0.40 
tCO2/MWh in 2015. The performance would become more 
ambitious over time, declining by 0.01 tCO2/MWh per year 
through 2035, as shown in Table 4.
TABLE 4
National Clean Energy Standard Goals 
through 2035
Year  National Clean Energy Standard (tCO2/MWh)
2015  0.40
2020  0.35
2025  0.30
2030  0.25
2035  0.20
Such standards would drive the U.S. power sector to surpass 
the current extent of clean energy generation in the European 
Union and Japan. It would require the U.S. power sector to 
ramp up the generation of cleaner power at approximately the 
same annual rate over the next five years as China realized 
over 2005–2008.
Point of regulation. The point of regulation for the NCES 
would be at the power plant. This would take advantage of the 
existing monitoring system on fossil power units, replicate 
the current point of regulation for other power plant policies 
(such as under the Acid Rain Program), and obviate the need 
to map electricity distributed to consumers back to original 
generating units that would be required by establishing the 
point of regulation downstream from the generating facility.4   
This approach also facilitates expansion of the program to 
cover  on-site  power  generation  at  manufacturing  facilities 
to  reduce  the  incentive  for  leakage—in  other  words,  the 
relocation of power generation away from regulated utilities 
and in an unregulated space. To avoid imposing costs on very 
small power generators in the manufacturing sector, the EPA 
and  Department  of  Energy  (DOE)  should  jointly  establish 
a minimum size that triggers coverage by the performance 
standard through rule making. Legislation creating a clean 
energy  standard  should  provide  the  regulatory  authorities 
with the flexibility to design rules tailored to combined heat 
and power facilities to ensure that the clean energy standard 
does not distort decisions on power and heat production in a 
way that causes adverse environmental impacts.
Tradable  clean  energy  credits.  To  promote  cost-effective 
attainment  of  these  goals  and  to  create  robust  incentives 
for innovation and deployment, power plants that beat the 
standard create tradable clean energy credits that can be sold 
to power plants whose emissions per megawatt hour exceed the 
standard. A clean energy credit is denominated in increments The Hamilton Project  •  Brookings   13
[Tradable credits provide] an economic incentive for 
investment in zero and low-emission power plants 
since they can produce a revenue stream through the 
sale of clean energy credits.
of one metric ton of CO2. Clean energy credits may be banked 
for compliance purposes in a future year.
This approach lowers the cost of compliance by power plants 
with  high-technology  costs  by  allowing  them  effectively 
to  finance  low-emission  generation  by  other  power  plants 
through  their  purchase  of  performance  credits.  It  thus 
provides an economic incentive for investment in zero and 
low-emission power plants since they can produce a revenue 
stream through the sale of clean energy credits.
Compliance.  Power  plants  would  demonstrate  compliance 
with the standard on an annual basis through a three-month 
“true-up” period after each compliance year. A power plant 
could  demonstrate  compliance  with  the  NCES  through  a 
combination  of  the  following  approaches.  First,  the  power 
plant has lesser or equal emissions per megawatt hour than 
the standard set to drive clean energy deployment. Second, 
the  power  plant  may  purchase  clean  energy  credits  from 
other power plants such that the combination of clean energy 
credits and the power plant’s own performance satisfies the 
standard. Third, the power plant may also purchase additional 
clean energy credits from the federal government at a preset 
price  that,  in  combination  with  its  own  generation  profile 
and purchased clean energy credits, would satisfy the NCES. 
This is similar to the “alternative compliance payments” in a 
number of state renewable portfolio standards (RPSs).
The federal clean energy credits would initially be set at $15 
(in 2010 dollars). The price for these credits would increase 
over time. They would be indexed to inflation (measured by 
the GDP deflator) and increase 7 percent annually above the 
inflation adjustment over the first ten years until reaching 
about $30 per credit in 2025. This ten-year ramp-up in the 
program would result in a clean energy credit price in 2025 
that is on a par with the estimated damages from the carbon 
pollution associated with power generation (see Interagency 
Working  Group  on  Social  Cost  of  Carbon,  United  States 
Government  2010,  Appendix  A1).  If  the  clearing  price  for 
tradable clean energy credits equals the federal clean energy 
credit  price,  zero-carbon  power  would  receive  an  average 
price of $21/MWh for generation over the first ten years of the 
program. This is equal to the current value of the production 
tax credit for wind, geothermal, and many other renewable 
sources, and exceeds the value of the production tax credit 
available to the first 6 gigawatts of new nuclear power under 
the 2005 Energy Policy Act. Beyond 2025, the price of federal 
clean energy credits would continue to increase at a rate of 
2.4 percent per year (in addition to inflation) to match the 
estimated increase in the incremental damages from carbon 
pollution.
Clean Energy Fund. An initial tranche of annual revenues 
generated by the sale of federal clean energy credits would 
be dedicated to supporting federal energy research. In 2015, 
the first $2 billion of annual revenues would be directed to 
support energy R&D. This initial tranche would increase at a 
rate of 10 percent per year to provide additional funding for 
energy R&D, and thus would ramp up to about $5 billion in 
2025. Any excess revenues beyond this tranche may be used 
for deficit reduction or reducing current tax rates, such as the 
payroll tax. These funds could increase activities at ARPA-E 
(the new advanced research projects program at the DOE), 
finance  first-of-a-kind  demonstration  projects  as  suggested 
by Deutch (2011), and address other pressing energy research 
needs.5 
Implementing agencies. The EPA and the DOE would jointly 
administer  the  NCES.  This  would  reflect  EPA’s  experience 
in implementing cost-effective, market-based approaches to 
reducing power-generation pollution as well as EPA’s existing 
emission  monitoring  infrastructure.  It  also  would  reflect 
DOE’s experience in monitoring power sector generation and 
capacity investment and in implementing clean energy R&D 
programs.
ECONOMIC IMPACTS
Cost-effectiveness.  The  envisioned  NCES  includes  several 
cost-effective  design  elements  intended  to  minimize  the 
cost  of  driving  clean  power  generation  and  of  providing 
environmental benefits. First, the opportunity to buy and sell 
clean  energy  credits  should  enable  utilities,  entrepreneurs, 
innovators,  and  others  to  seek  out  and  exploit  the  lowest-
cost ways of providing clean energy. Second, power plants 
maintain the option to bank, or save, clean energy credits 
generated from current clean energy power generation for use 
in a future compliance period. This will promote dynamic 
cost-effectiveness.  Third,  and 
perhaps  most  important,  the 
federal  clean  energy  credits 
available  at  a  preset  price 
provide  a  guarantee  that 
prices  for  credits,  and  hence 
generation  costs  net  of  the 
NCES  and  electricity  prices, 
will not exceed specified levels.14   Promoting Clean Energy in the American Power Sector
The federal clean energy credit price will very likely determine 
the clearing price for tradable clean energy credits, given the 
ambition of the performance goal and the levels of the federal 
clean energy credit prices, at least in the early years. In doing 
so, all power plants will face the same incentive to deploy clean 
energy. Given the increasing stringency in the performance 
goals over time and the opportunity to bank unused clean 
energy credits for future use (even if unexpectedly low-cost 
technologies and fuels come into the power market that might 
result in compliance at a credit price below the federal credit 
price) there will be the future demand that can serve to bring 
the clean energy credit price back to the federal credit price 
level.
Investment  certainty.  Uncertainty  about  the  magnitude  of 
the incentive for clean energy deployment risks undermining 
investment. For example, in the context of state renewable 
energy standards, it is not uncommon for renewable project 
developers to seek out power purchasing agreements that lock 
in electricity prices for delivered power over the long term 
(e.g., twenty years). Volatile prices for state renewable energy 
credits complicate project financing. In order to secure debt 
and  equity  financing,  the  project  developers  often  have  to 
eliminate this price uncertainty by negotiating a set price for 
power in the power purchasing agreements with distribution 
utilities.  Designing  a  clean  energy  standard  that  will  very 
likely yield a stream of clean energy credit prices set by the 
federal credit price over time will provide the kind of certainty 
that will promote project financing for new power projects. 
It also will deliver more certainty for those making upstream 
investment decisions, such as in shale gas development and 
wind turbine manufacturing capacity, so that decision-makers 
can understand the potential market demand and returns to 
such investments.
It is also important to recognize that this certainty in the 
price  can  have  very  important  implications  for  the  start-
up of a new policy. Under this proposal, a power plant (or 
a  generation  utility  operating  a  number  of  power  plants) 
considers the time profile of the federal clean energy credit 
prices and then assesses its opportunities for reducing the 
emission intensity of generation at a cost below that of the 
credit. In a policy regime in which credits are tradable and 
the price of the credits will reflect the eventual clearing price 
in the credit market, power plants and utilities need to resolve 
the  uncertainty  about  their  own  opportunities  to  deploy 
clean energy and form expectations about other power plants’ 
opportunities to do so, and thus plan against an expected 
credit price. Some power plants may expect high credit prices 
and make one set of investments, and other power plants may 
expect low credit prices and make another set of investments. 
Given the irreversible nature of some of these investments, 
these decisions, which ex post may appear as mistakes once 
the market credit price has been established, may increase the 
total cost of deploying clean energy relative to this proposal in 
which power plants do not need to plan against the uncertainty 
in credit prices.
Electricity prices and policy costs. To illustrate the potential 
impact of this NCES on electricity prices, let us assume that 
the  federal  clean  energy  credit  price  is  binding.  Given  the 
variation in electricity regulatory regimes across the nation, 
I will focus on a simple version of marginal cost pricing to 
represent competitive markets 
and  a  simple  version  of  cost-
of-service  (average  cost) 
pricing to represent regulated 
markets.  To  provide  regional 
price  impacts,  I  focus  on 
twenty  electricity  markets 
as  identified  by  the  EIA  and 
for  which  2008  and  forecast 
2015  electricity  rates  have 
been published in the Annual 
Energy Outlook (EIA 2011a).6  Given the focus on the near 
term (through 2015), this illustration assumes no changes in 
emission intensity relative to their 2008 levels and no changes 
in generating capacity, which yields a potentially upward bias 
in the electricity rate impacts.
In  2015,  the  federal  clean  energy  credit  price  will  be  $15. 
Power  plants  would  make  investments  in  reducing  the 
emission  intensity  of  their  generation  until  it  reached  the 
value set by the federal clean energy credit price. By effectively 
exempting  the  first  0.4  tCO2/MWh,  this  NCES  provides 
an  implicit  rate-based  output  subsidy.  Thus,  power  plants 
and utilities would adjust generation to reflect this implicit 
generation subsidy. Changes in electricity rates should reflect 
both the $15 credit price and the implicit generation subsidy 
in the NCES. Fischer (2010) and Fischer and Newell (2008) 
illustrate how, in some cases, the implicit generation subsidy 
in renewable energy standards and performance-based clean 
energy standards akin to this proposal could dominate the 
credit price and effectively result in a net decline in electricity 
rates in competitive markets. Average costs, and hence rates 
Uncertainty about the magnitude of the incentive 
for clean energy deployment risks undermining 
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in cost-of-service regulated markets, would not experience a 
net decline. To be conservative, I have assumed that electricity 
prices do not decline under an NCES relative to the forecast 
business-as-usual levels.
In  most  competitive  markets,  natural  gas  is  the  marginal 
source  of  power  generation.  Given  the  underutilization  of 
existing combined-cycle natural gas capacity, the marginal 
source of power in these markets will often have an emission 
rate on the order of about 0.44 tCO2/MWh. In some cases, 
less-efficient combustion turbines may provide power to meet 
peak demand, and have a higher emission rate, perhaps on 
the order of about 0.67 tCO2/MWh. This suggests that the 
upper-bound  price  impact  with  combined-cycle  generation 
technology would be on the order of about 0.06¢/kWh, and 
as  much  as  about  0.4¢/kWh  with  less-efficient  combustion 
turbine technology in 2015, based on this equation:
upper-bound retail price impact per megawatt hour = 
[marginal intensity in 2008 – standard] * $15,
where the marginal intensity refers to the emission intensity 
of  the  marginal  generation  plant.  To  be  conservative,  the 
estimates presented below reflect an assumption that marginal 
power is always generated from combustion turbine plants.
In  regulated  markets,  a  coal-fired  power  plant  with  an 
emission rate of 1.0 tCO2/MWh does not need clean energy 
credits to cover the first 40 percent of its emissions in 2015. An 
upper bound on the 2015 average cost impact, and hence the 
electricity price increase, can then be represented by
upper-bound retail price impact per megawatt hour = 
[average intensity in 2008 – standard] * $15,
where  the  average  intensity  refers  to  the  mean  emission 
intensity of power generation in a given regulated market. 
The competitive and cost-of-service regulation price impact 
estimates represent upper bounds because a generator may find 
low-cost ways to improve the intensity of generation at a unit 
for less than $15/tCO2 between 2008 and 2015. This could take 
the form of modifying the fuel mix (changing the type of coal, 
cofiring with biomass, and so on), investing in more-efficient 
boiler technology, improving maintenance of existing boiler 
equipment, and so on. The effect of improving existing units 
could be more pronounced in cost-of-service markets, since 
an improvement in every generator impacts the cost impact 
through the rate-making process, while only improving the 
marginal  generators  would  impact  the  electricity  rates  in 
competitive markets.
Employing this upper bound, illustrative approach to price 
impacts  shows  that  the  average  retail  price  impact  in  the 
United States of complying with the proposed NCES is less 
than 3 percent of the average retail price of electricity forecast 
for  2015.  In  competitive  electricity  markets,  if  combustion 
turbine gas plants serve as the marginal source of power (a 
conservative  assumption),  then  compliance  would  result 
in  an  upper-bound  estimate  of  electricity  rates  about  3–5 
percent higher than they are forecast to be in 2015 but still 
about 8–29 percent lower than they were in 2008. In cost-of-
service markets, electricity rates would range between 0–9 
percent higher than their 2015 forecast (Figure 4). Fourteen of 
the twenty electricity markets—representing about two out of 
every three states—would have lower electricity prices under 
this proposed NCES in 2015 than they did in 2008.
Fourteen of the twenty electricity markets—representing about two 
out of every three states—would have lower electricity prices under this 
proposed NCES in 2015 than they did in 2008.16   Promoting Clean Energy in the American Power Sector
FIGURE 4
Upper-bound Electricity Rate Impacts (2010 cents per kWh)
Region  States  2008  2015  2015
Code    Rate  Rate  Rate
         with CES 
 
ERCT  Texas  11.7  7.9  8.3
FRCC  Florida  11.0  10.9  11.1
MROE   Michigan, Wisconsin  9.2  8.1  8.5
MROW  Iowa, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, North Dakota, South Dakota, Wisconsin  7.5  7.3  7.8
NEWE  Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, Vermont  16.4  14.1  14.5
NY*  New York* (NYCW, NYLI, and NYUP markets)  19.7  17.8  18.2
RFCE  Delaware, Maryland, New Jersey, Pennsylvania  12.4  10.4  10.8
RFCM  Michigan   9.3  8.6  8.9
RFCW  Illinois, Indiana, Ohio, West Virginia, Pennsylvania  8.2  8.9  9.4
SRDA  Arkansas, Louisiana, Mississippi  9.3  7.5  7.6
SRGW  Illinois, Missouri  7.6  6.6  7.2
SRSE  Alabama, Georgia, Mississippi, Florida  9.2  8.3  8.6
SRCE  Alabama, Kentucky, Mississippi, Tennessee  7.6  6.5  7.0
SRVC  North Carolina, South Carolina, Virginia  8.2  8.1  8.2
SPNO  Missouri, Kansas  7.7  8.4  9.0
SPSO  Arkansas, Louisiana, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Texas  8.0  7.4  7.8
AZNM  Arizona, California, Nevada, New Mexico  9.6  8.8  9.0
CAMX  California  12.7  14.2  14.6
NWPP  Idaho, Montana, Nevada, Oregon, Utah, Washington, Wyoming  6.9  6.2  6.2
RMPA  Colorado, Nebraska, South Dakota, Wyoming  8.5  9.2  9.7
Source: Figure 4: Constructed by author based on EIA (2011a).
Note: New York figures reflect the New York City–Westchester electricity market.  The 2015 Rate with CES estimates represent upper bounds that reflect several conservative assumptions: (1) 
no new generation capacity comes online by 2015; (2) regional emission intensities do not improve relative to their 2008 levels; and, (3) combustion turbine natural gas plants serve as marginal 
sources of production (and hence determine marginal cost pricing) in the ERCT, NEWE, NY*, RFCE, and CAMX regions.  The Hamilton Project  •  Brookings   17
Revenue Raised through the Federal Clean Energy Credit. 
The federal clean energy credit ramps up from an initial price 
of $15 in 2015, and, given recent analyses of the potential for 
increasing the share of clean energy in U.S. power generation, it 
will very likely bind in (at least) the early years of the program. 
This provides a revenue source that could support investment 
in  advanced  energy  R&D  to  promote  the  development  of 
lower-cost  technologies  that  could  accelerate  the  eventual 
commercialization  and  deployment  of  clean  energy.  Some 
revenue could also address the potential increase in federal 
outlays to the extent the NCES increases electricity prices. 
The balance of the revenue could finance deficit reduction or a 
reduction in existing tax rates (e.g. reduce the payroll tax rate).
To illustrate the potential magnitude of the revenue generation 
through  the  clean  energy  credit,  recent  carbon  pricing 
analyses by the EIA suggest that the emission intensity of the 
U.S. power sector could fall to about 0.50 tCO2/MWh in 2015 
at a $15 credit price (EIA 2010b). Thus, the 0.40 tCO2/MWh 
performance goal is a stretch for the economy in 2015, and sale 
of federal clean energy credits would net the government about 
$6.5 billion in revenues in 2015 (Figure 5). Other analyses 
that suggest that more clean energy could be deployed at this 
price (e.g., if wind or natural gas prices, or both, are lower) 
would deliver lower revenues. Given estimated improvement 
in emission intensity over the first decade of the NCES at 
the binding federal clean energy credit price, revenues are 
expected to increase to about $10 billion in 2020 and reach 
about $18 billion in 2025. These revenues would easily cover 
the proposed funding levels of $2 billion for a Clean Energy 
Fund in 2015 that ramps up to $5 billion in 2025.
Impacts on manufacturing. The modest increase in electricity 
prices should have a limited impact on major industrial sector 
consumers of electricity. To illustrate these modest impacts, I 
have drawn from previous work that estimated the relationship 
between  electricity  prices  and  production  and  trade  for 
more than four hundred U.S. manufacturing industries over 
twenty years (Aldy and Pizer 2009). This analysis allows for 
the effect of an increase in electricity price on an industry’s 
production and on an industry’s consumption (measured as 
production plus net imports) to vary with the energy intensity 
of manufacturing. The empirical model illustrates that the 
production  from  energy-lean  manufacturing—representing 
up to about the first 80 percent of the manufacturing sector 
when  measured  by  energy  intensity  of  output—does  not 
meaningfully  change  as  electricity  prices  increase.  More 
energy-intensive  manufacturing,  however,  has  historically 
experienced a decline in production and an increase in net 
imports when electricity prices have increased.
FIGURE 5
Revenues Generated Through the Sale of Federal Clean Energy Credits, 2015–2025
($ billions)
Source: Constructed by author based on estimated emission intensity and electricity generation under various scenarios presented in EIA (2010b).18   Promoting Clean Energy in the American Power Sector
I have employed our empirical model to simulate the impacts 
of a $15 federal clean energy credit price on select energy-
intensive manufacturing industries and the manufacturing 
sector  as  a  whole  (Table  5).  Since  the  implicit  generation 
subsidy mutes the price impact of a clean energy standard, the 
impact of this policy on industrial sector electricity prices is 
lower than it would be under a $15 per ton CO2 cap-and-trade 
allowance price (the basis for the initial simulation presented 
in Aldy and Pizer 2009). The average national increase in the 
retail price of electricity in 2015 under the NCES would be 
about 0.25¢/kWh, representing about a 4.1 percent increase in 
industrial sector electricity rates.7  The manufacturing sector 
as a whole would experience about a 0.7 percent decline in 
production, with about half of this (0.4 percent) made up by an 
increase in net imports. For energy-intensive manufacturing, 
TABLE 5
Estimated Impacts of a $15 Clean Energy Credit Price on Energy-Intensive  
Manufacturing in 2015
Industry  Production  Consumption  Competitiveness
Industrial Chemicals  –1.5%  –1.0%  –0.5%
Paper  –1.8%  –1.3%  –0.6%
Iron & Steel  –1.5%  –1.1%  –0.5%
Aluminum  –1.1%  –0.7%  –0.4%
Cement  –0.9%  –0.5%  –0.4%
Bulk Glass  –1.9%  –1.5%  –0.4%
Manufacturing average  –0.7%  –0.3%  –0.4%
Source: Constructed by author based on Aldy and Pizer (2009).
Note: Simulation results based on the assumption that a $15 credit price raises electricity prices in the industrial sector by 4 percent on average nationally. Competitiveness = Production – 
Consumption.
the  decline  in  production  is  greater  than  the  average  for 
manufacturing—ranging between 0.9 and 1.9 percent for the 
six major classes of energy-intensive manufacturing listed in 
the table—but is relatively small within the context of historic 
annual swings in manufacturing output. Across the energy-
intensive  manufacturing  industries,  the  competitiveness 
effect—the increase in net imports—ranges from about 0.4 
to 0.6 percent. This net import effect is also relatively small 
within the context of historic annual swings in the U.S. trade 
position. The start-up of the NCES in 2015 with a federal clean 
energy credit price set at $15 would appear to have only very 
modest effects on energy-intensive manufacturing.The Hamilton Project  •  Brookings   19
FIGURE 6
U.S. Power Sector Carbon Pollution 2005–2009 and Estimated Through 2035 with  
National Clean Energy Standard Performance Goals 
CLEAN ENERGY DEPLOYMENT AND EMISSION 
IMPACTS
If U.S. clean energy generation delivers an emission intensity 
consistent with the proposed 2035 standard, then power sector 
emissions are likely to be about 60 percent below their 2005 
levels (Figure 6). The 2020 performance goal for that year of 
0.35 tCO2/MWh would result in power sector emissions about 
34 percent below 2005 levels. An illustration of the potential 
impact of the federal clean energy credit on emissions drawn 
by the author from past carbon price modeling analyses by the 
EIA (2010b) suggests that the $21 credit price in 2020 would 
result in power sector emissions of 2.04 billion metric tons 
of CO2—15 percent below 2005 levels (and equal to about 13 
percent below the “no new policy” reference case).
Source: Constructed by author based on EIA (2010b).
Note: The 2015–2035 estimates reflect an assumption that the performance goals are met without accessing the federal clean energy credits and a conservative assumption that generation 
levels do not fall relative to the expectation under the status quo.
 
M
i
l
l
i
o
n
 
M
e
t
r
i
c
 
T
o
n
s
 
o
f
 
C
O
220   Promoting Clean Energy in the American Power Sector
If  mitigating  greenhouse  gas  emissions  is  so  important, 
why  do  you  recommend  an  intensity  performance  metric 
instead  of  emission  caps?  An  emission-intensity  approach 
is consistent with the typical approach to promoting cleaner 
power generation in the U.S. electricity sector. For example, 
the Bush administration proposed regulations in 2007 that 
would limit emissions of sulfur dioxide, particulate matter, 
nitrogen  oxides,  and  mercury  on  a  pounds-per–megawatt 
hour  basis  from  new  electricity  and  industrial  steam-
generating sources (72 Federal Register 32710). The Obama 
administration  recently  proposed  to  regulate  hazardous 
air  pollutants—including  mercury,  hydrogen  chloride,  and 
particulate  matter—on  a  pounds-per–megawatt  hour  basis 
(EPA  2011a).  In  implementing  the  Clean  Air  Act’s  Title  V 
operating  permits  program,  state  regulatory  agencies  also 
establish  power  plant–specific  emission  intensity  limits  for 
conventional  air  pollutants.  The  EPA  (2011b)  guidance  to 
the states for Title V permitting programs recommends an 
output-based standard, such as pounds-per–megawatt hour 
of  electricity,  for  greenhouse  gas  emissions.  Thus,  utilities 
operating power plants and state and federal regulators have 
substantial familiarity and experience with policies that limit 
emissions per megawatt hour.
The  federal  government  also  has  a  positive  track  record 
implementing this kind of emission-intensity approach with 
tradable credits. In the 1980s, to phase down lead in motor 
gasoline, the federal government established lead performance 
goals (grams of lead per gallon) for refineries. Those refineries 
that beat the standard could generate lead credits that could be 
sold to other refineries or banked for future compliance (Kerr 
and Newell 2003).
The  Canadian  province  of  Alberta  recently  began 
implementing a greenhouse gas emission–intensity program 
that  covers  power  plants,  other  industrial  sources,  and  oil 
sands development. Under this program, power plants must 
reduce  their  emissions  per  megawatt  hour  by  12  percent 
relative  to  a  historic  baseline.  Since  2007,  this  policy  has 
reduced greenhouse gas emissions by about 17 million tons 
relative to business as usual. In addition, the Alberta program 
has directed nearly $200 million to a clean energy technology 
Chapter 3: Responses to Some Likely Questions
A
s the debate over a clean energy standard evolves, a 
number of questions about this proposal and about 
the concept of a clean energy standard more generally 
will arise. (For example, refer to the Clean Energy Standard 
White Paper [U.S. Senate n.d.]). I identify three sets of likely 
policy questions: (1) design questions specific to this proposal; 
(2) questions about the role of EPA regulatory authority and 
state RPSs in the context of an NCES; and (3) questions about a 
clean energy standard relative to more-comprehensive energy 
and climate policies.
NATIONAL CLEAN ENERGY STANDARD DESIGN 
CHOICES
Why  an  intensity-based  performance  goal  instead  of  a 
portfolio  standard?  An  intensity-based  performance  goal 
is by definition technology-neutral. In contrast, a portfolio 
standard—as  implemented  in  state  RPS  programs  and  as 
envisioned in some federal RPS proposals—identifies a set of 
“qualifying” technologies that are eligible for generating clean 
energy credits. This reflects a static assessment of generation 
technology that risks chilling innovation in new technologies 
that  may  not  fit  neatly  in  the  initial  list  of  qualifying 
technologies. It also risks picking winners and losers among 
existing technologies that may not be internally consistent or 
transparent.
Instead  of  picking  winning  technologies,  a  performance-
based goal establishes a transparent, easily measured metric 
that  sends  clear  signals  to  innovators  undertaking  work 
on  possible  energy  breakthroughs.  It  also  delivers  a  clear 
incentive to plant managers to make marginal improvements 
in existing facilities—for instance, to improve the efficiency of 
combustion or to test carbon sequestration and storage with a 
small stream from the smokestacks—since this can generate 
clean energy credits (or reduce demand for credits) that would 
not be available under a portfolio approach. In doing so, a 
performance-based  goal  promotes  cost-effectiveness  across 
power plants. Dynamic cost-effectiveness and efficiency may 
be  lost  under  a  portfolio  standard  because  of  the  adverse 
impacts it could have on innovation relative to a performance 
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fund  financed  through  an  alternative  compliance  payment 
mechanism similar to the federal clean energy credit in this 
proposed NCES (Government of Alberta 2010).
How did you choose the performance goals for the NCES?  The 
2015 goal is a stretch—going from about 0.56 to 0.40 tCO2/
MWh in five years. International experience suggests that this 
goal is feasible. The 2015 goal is approximately equal to the 
recent (2008) emission intensity of European and Japanese 
power sectors. Ambitious goals ensure that the federal clean 
energy credit price sets the clearing price in the tradable credit 
market and thus delivers certainty to facilitate investment and 
efficient operating decisions. In the event that the cost of clean 
energy falls significantly over the next two decades, there is 
a  greater  likelihood  that  the  long-term  performance  goals 
would be met and a lower credit price would be necessary (and 
a lower price would be realized in the tradable credit market) 
to drive clean energy deployment. If the federal clean energy 
credit price is not binding in 2035, then power sector emissions 
would be some 60 percent below 2005 levels by 2035.
How did you choose the federal clean energy credit price? 
The deployment of clean energy technology depends on the 
returns investors receive from the installation and use of such 
technologies. The returns are not determined by economy-wide 
emission or emission-intensity goals: they are determined by 
the prices faced by investors for a given project. Uncertainty 
about those prices, and hence the returns on investment, will 
delay or deter investment.8  A federal clean energy credit price 
that provides a transparent, stable investment signal is critical 
to advancing clean energy deployment. The level of the federal 
price, in conjunction with the ambitious performance goals, 
would make it very likely that the clearing price on credits will 
be set by the federal credit price.
The federal credit price starts at a modest level of $15 and then 
ramps up 7 percent annually (in addition to inflation) such that 
by 2025 the credit price will be consistent with the estimated 
damages from carbon pollution (Interagency Working Group 
on Social Cost of Carbon, United States Government 2010). 
Thus, a business investing in clean energy under this policy 
would generate social benefits equal to or greater than the cost 
of the project. This delivers the efficient outcome that would be 
realized by a competitive market if businesses accounted for 
and mitigated the damages caused by carbon pollution. This 
is analogous to the incentives a business faces to dispose of its 
solid waste—the fees paid to waste haulers can encourage a 
business to find ways to limit its waste stream (e.g., “reduce, 
reuse,  recycle”).  Businesses  do  this  because  they  cannot 
simply dump their waste on their neighbor’s property, but that 
“dumping on the neighbor” is exactly what businesses (and 
consumers) do every day with carbon pollution, under current 
law.
Zero-carbon power would receive an average price of $21/
MWh for generation over the first ten years of the program 
as  long  as  the  federal  credit  price  determines  the  tradable 
clean energy credit-clearing price. This is equal to the current 
value of the production tax credit for wind, geothermal, and 
many other renewable sources, and exceeds the value of the 
production tax credit available to the first 6 gigawatts of new 
nuclear power under the 2005 Energy Policy Act. In contrast to 
current tax credits, the proposed NCES would provide credits 
and a revenue stream to these renewable sources beyond just 
the first ten years of the policy. Certainty about the value of the 
clean energy credits will facilitate project finance by removing 
one variable from the evaluation of project risk.
This approach of setting a ceiling on the price of tradable 
clean energy credits through the federal clean energy credit 
price is akin to the common practice of allowing utilities to 
comply with state RPSs by making an “alternative compliance 
payment.” The alternative compliance payment is a preset per 
megawatt  hour  price,  ranging  between  $10/MWh  to  more 
than $60/MWh among state RPS programs. Several legislative 
proposals, including the RPS in the 2009 American Clean 
Energy and Security Act (H.R. 2454), the RPS in the 2009 
American  Clean  Energy  Leadership  Act  (S.  1462),  and  the 
Federal Diverse Energy Standard in the 2010 Practical Energy 
and Climate Plan Act (S. 3464), have included an alternative 
...a performance-based goal establishes a transparent, easily measured 
metric that sends clear signals to innovators undertaking work on 
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compliance  payment  ranging  between  $21/MWh  and  $50/
MWh.
Why allow all power plants to produce clean energy credits 
instead of just new capacity?  In this proposal, I have focused 
on providing clean energy credits—and thus an incentive for 
clean  energy  power  generation—to  all  generating  capacity 
that beats the performance goal. Some have suggested that 
a  clean  energy  standard  should  provide  incentives  only  to 
incremental investments in power generation technology with 
a low emission profile. The current underutilized natural gas–
generating capacity, in combination with increasing domestic 
gas supplies at low cost, provides an inexpensive means to 
lower the emission intensity of the U.S. power sector. Crediting 
only new capacity would increase the costs of changing the 
generation mix in the power sector and, given the most recent 
forecasts for relatively slow growth in electricity demand over 
the  next  decade  or  more,  would  likely  increase  generating 
capacity in an industry with existing underutilized capacity.
Most states that have implemented an RPS allow all qualifying 
generation facilities—not just new or incremental renewable 
power investment—to generate renewable energy credits. For 
example, eighteen of twenty-two state RPS programs on the 
books by 2007 allowed for existing plants to be eligible to 
generate credits (Wiser, Namovicz, Gielicki, and Smith 2007).
Why  exclude  efficiency  and  other  ways  to  offset  emission 
intensity?  In  this  proposal,  I  do  not  provide  an  explicit 
opportunity for utilities to offset some of their clean energy 
generation through energy efficiency measures. In addition, 
I do not provide for power plants to seek out emission offset 
opportunities  beyond  the  scope  of  the  power  sector  as  a 
compliance  option.  In  both  cases,  estimating  the  offset  is 
complex, requires extensive review and monitoring by third 
parties  or  the  regulatory  agencies,  and  risks  undermining 
the objective of the NCES to the extent that some projects do 
not, in practice, deliver meaningful emission reductions. To 
maintain the simplicity of this program, I focus on granting 
credits for what is observed. In contrast, offsets aim to grant 
credits  for  what  is  not  observed;  since  the  counterfactual 
cannot  be  observed,  there  is  uncertainty  about  the  actual 
environmental integrity of an offset. Unlike past legislative 
proposals, the use of the federal clean energy credits protects 
the power sector from unexpectedly high costs of the policy 
and thus reduces the need for offsets as a cost-containment 
mechanism.
It is important to note that the NCES will provide several 
implicit  incentives  for  improvements  in  energy  efficiency. 
First, the standard will encourage investments and process 
modifications to improve the efficiency of fossil fuel boilers. 
Second,  to  the  extent  that  electricity  prices  increase, 
consumers will have an incentive to become more efficient in 
their consumption of electricity.
Why are power plants the point of regulation?  Requiring 
power plants to comply with the NCES would simplify its 
implementation by taking advantage of the existing monitoring 
of CO2 emissions at most generating units and the reporting 
of power generation to state public utility commissions and 
the DOE. Such an approach could also easily cover power-
generating  facilities  on  manufacturing  sites—akin  to  the 
current  EPA  practice  of  implementing  emission-intensity 
performance  standards  for  conventional  air  pollutants  for 
power plants and large industrial boilers. This would limit the 
extent of leakage under the policy. It would not be very effective 
to promote clean energy in the power sector while allowing 
manufacturing facilities to burn dirty fuel; if manufacturers 
decided to generate more of their electricity on site instead of 
purchasing it from a utility, it would circumvent the intent of 
the policy.
Why dedicate revenues from the sale of the federal clean 
energy  credit  to  energy  R&D?  The  financing  for  a  Clean 
Energy  Fund  reflects  a  general  consensus  on  the  need  for 
increasing support for advanced energy R&D. For example, 
the American Energy Innovation Council (2010) has called for 
$16 billion per year to support energy innovation, including a 
$1 billion annual commitment to ARPA-E, and the President’s 
Council  of  Advisors  on  Science  and  Technology  (PCAST; 
2010) has recommended increasing funding for total energy 
R&D and demonstration and deployment to $16 billion per 
year. The suggested energy R&D funding levels by these groups 
exceed the amount set aside under this proposal. Nonetheless, 
the Clean Energy Fund would deliver a significant increase 
in  energy  R&D,  which  can  facilitate  the  development  and 
commercialization  of  new  energy  technologies  that  could 
lower  the  cost  of  attaining  the  longer-term  clean  energy 
goals  and  thus  benefit  electricity  consumers  in  the  long 
run. This reflects the strong complementarity, as opposed to 
substitutability, of an energy R&D program and a clean energy 
deployment policy like this NCES. Both incentives for clean 
energy deployment and support for energy R&D are necessary 
for an effective national energy policy (Stavins 2010).
This also reflects the approach taken by a number of states 
in how they direct alternative compliance payment revenues 
to clean energy investment. Pennsylvania uses its alternative 
compliance payment revenues to finance the state Sustainable 
Energy Funds program. Massachusetts dedicates alternative 
compliance  payment  revenues  to  the  Massachusetts  Clean 
Energy  Center.  The  Ohio  Advanced  Energy  Fund  receives 
any  revenues  generated  through  the  Ohio  RPS  alternative 
compliance  payment.  New  Jersey  also  channels  alternative 
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renewable  energy  standards. 
The  current  debate  over  EPA’s 
greenhouse gas emission regulatory 
authority  has  several  adverse 
outcomes  for  the  power  sector. 
First,  uncertainty  about  whether 
EPA  will  retain  authority  and,  if 
so,  whether  its  promulgated  rules 
would  withstand  legal  challenge, 
will  continue  to  chill  investment. 
Second,  time  and  resources 
dedicated to debating various kinds 
of riders regarding EPA authority 
reduce the opportunities for a serious discussion about how to 
advance effective U.S. energy policy.
Third, an NCES likely represents the most effective way to 
drive  demand  for  domestically  produced  natural  gas.  The 
significant  expansion  in  domestic  gas  resources,  especially 
of  unconventional  sources  of  natural  gas  such  as  shale, 
has  the  potential  to  serve  a  significant  increase  in  gas 
demand. Yet, over the next ten years, there are not obvious 
opportunities  in  transportation,  industry,  or  the  buildings 
sector to meaningfully increase gas consumption. The costs 
of driving the use of natural gas in transportation—in terms 
of  infrastructure  and  building  new  kinds  of  vehicles—
will  likely  limit  gas  use  to  centralized  fueling  fleets.  Gas 
consumption in the industrial sector in 2010 returned to its 
2007 levels after declining in 2009, but it is not likely that the 
oil and gas industry views domestic manufacturing as a major 
growth sector for natural gas. Continued efforts to improve 
the  energy  efficiency  in  buildings  will  limit  opportunities 
to increase gas consumption in this sector. Thus, the power 
sector—especially  given  the  build-out  of  combined-cycle 
natural gas capacity over the past two decades—is the single 
best  market  for  the  potential  increase  in  domestic  natural 
gas production (MIT Energy Initiative 2010).9  Since there 
is very little oil consumed in the U.S. power sector, a policy 
that promotes gas consumption to generate electricity does 
not cannibalize the oil and gas industry’s profits from refined 
petroleum products. The political calculus of a clean energy 
standard may be different from the cap-and-trade debate for 
several major players in the oil and gas industry, which could 
help drive a business coalition of renewable, nuclear, and oil 
and gas companies to support such an approach. In addition, 
responsible development of shale gas resources provides an 
employment opportunity that could complement the potential 
employment impacts from manufacturing parts for renewable 
facilities, and construction of new power plants.
Why don’t you implement this approach through existing 
EPA  Clean  Air  Act  authority?10  Under  the  new  source 
performance standard provision of the Clean Air Act, EPA 
The political calculus of a clean energy standard 
may be different from the cap-and-trade debate for 
several major players in the oil and gas industry, 
which could help drive a business coalition of 
renewable, nuclear, and oil and gas companies to 
support such an approach.
Why don’t you exempt small power plants? Exempting small 
power plants runs the risk that utilities and perhaps some 
manufacturing facilities will decide to generate more power 
from small units that fall under any exemption threshold to 
avoid the need to comply with the policy. This will undermine 
the  incentive  to  innovate  and  deploy  clean  energy  and 
lower  the  program’s  benefits.  The  regulatory  authority  can 
determine if some very small facilities may be exempt, just as 
EPA employs a minimum generating capacity threshold for 
some  of  its  conventional  air  pollutant  regulations,  without 
causing significant risk of policy circumvention.
NATIONAL CLEAN ENERGY STANDARD VS. STATE 
RPS VS. EPA REGULATORY AUTHORITY
Why would Congress support legislation to create an NCES? 
First, such an approach, in a variety of forms, is similar to the 
status quo policy in twenty-nine states and Washington, DC 
(N.C. Solar Center and IREC). While most of these state programs 
focus on renewable power, some do extend to nonrenewable 
technologies that have zero or low emissions of greenhouse 
gases, such as integrated gasification combined cycle (IGCC) 
coal  technology  under  Pennsylvania’s  Alternative  Energy 
Portfolio Standard, landfill methane under North Carolina’s 
Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Portfolio Standard, 
and advanced nuclear power under Ohio’s Alternative Energy 
Resource Standard. The power generated in these twenty-nine 
states  and  Washington,  DC,  represented  about  65  percent 
of U.S. power generated in 2008. Adding another six states 
with renewable goals covers nearly 73 percent of U.S. power 
generation. This illustrates significant support for promoting 
various  kinds  of  clean  energy  technologies  through  new 
policies, although the variation in design and implementation 
across  states  also  suggests  value  in  harmonizing  policy 
through a national approach.
Second, a well-designed clean energy standard obviates the 
need for EPA greenhouse gas emission regulatory authority 
in  the  power  sector.  An  NCES  bill  should  preempt  EPA 
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with a national policy that reflects the best insights drawn 
from these state efforts. Continuing state RPSs with an NCES 
will have at least one of the following two impacts: First, the 
duplication of policies will increase the administrative costs of 
complying with state and federal policies. Second, the benefits 
from deploying clean energy in a state with an aggressive RPS 
could be completely offset by reduced clean energy generation 
in  less-aggressive  states  under  the  federal  policy  (Goulder 
and  Stavins  forthcoming).  In  effect,  electricity  consumers 
in  the  more-aggressive  states  subsidize  the  electricity 
consumers in less-aggressive states. This raises the total cost 
of promoting clean energy deployment and undermines the 
cost-effectiveness of the national policy.
An NCES could represent a significant simplification of the 
existing regulatory regime by substituting for EPA greenhouse 
gas  emission  regulatory  authority  in  the  power  sector  and 
existing state renewable and alternative energy standards.
NATIONAL CLEAN ENERGY STANDARD VS. 
COMPREHENSIVE ENERGY AND CLIMATE POLICIES
Isn’t this just a back-door cap-and-trade program or carbon 
tax?  There  are  basically  just  three  ways  to  promote  clean 
energy  deployment:  (1)  pay  utilities  to  build  and  generate 
electricity from clean energy power plants, (2) make utilities 
build  more  clean  energy  power  plants  and  increase  their 
dispatch from such plants, or (3) raise the price on dirty energy 
commensurate to the harm to society this source of generation 
imposes. The first option has been federal policy, through tax 
credits, for nearly two decades, but fiscal constraints and the 
costs associated with imposing taxes on other parts of the 
economy necessary to finance tax credits for the power sector 
does not portend a bright future for this policy option. The 
second option reflects regulatory mandates that do not have 
much current political favor, that risk increasing the costs 
necessary to deploy a given amount of clean energy, and that 
may not deliver strong incentives for innovation. The third 
option represents a cost-effective, market-based approach to 
driving clean energy deployment that includes cap-and-trade; 
carbon tax; most state RPSs; the renewable electricity standard 
in the bipartisan 2009 Senate energy bill (S. 1462); the Lugar, 
Graham, and Murkowski diverse energy standard (S. 3464); 
and the proposed NCES.
This approach differs from the 2009–2010 versions of cap-
and-trade along a few key dimensions. First, this NCES does 
not have a cap on emissions. Second, this NCES is designed to 
be transparent and technology-neutral. While cap-and-trade 
allows for the government to allocate emission allowances in a 
way to build political support potentially without undermining 
cost-effectiveness  (Hahn  and  Stavins  forthcoming,  Stavins 
could design a “system” similar to the tradable performance 
standard envisioned under this NCES (Burtraw, Fraas, and 
Richardson 2011). There are several potential drawbacks to 
the Clean Air Act approach. First, it is unlikely that EPA could 
implement a system that could provide the price certainty that 
is envisioned in this NCES—in other words, it would not likely 
include a federal credit that could limit costs and generate 
revenues for the U.S. Treasury. Perhaps more important for 
clean  energy  project  finance,  it  may  be  legally  challenging 
for EPA to design a system that covers energy sources that do 
not produce greenhouse gas emissions—such as nuclear and 
renewable—that would allow for those sources to generate a 
revenue stream under EPA regulation just as they could under 
this proposal. It is also not clear if an EPA “system” would 
account for the net emission impact of biomass energy power 
plants (i.e., account for the biological sequestration) or if it 
would account only for the gross emissions from the power 
plant smokestack. If EPA could only account for the gross 
emissions, then it would adversely impact the deployment of 
biomass energy power plants and biomass cofiring at existing 
fossil plants.
Second, an approach focused on new sources under the new 
source  performance  standards  provision  of  the  Clean  Air 
Act would deliver very little environmental benefit since the 
vast majority of power generation over the next few decades 
will come from existing sources. EPA would need to design, 
implement, and harmonize an “existing” source performance 
standard with the new source performance standard in order 
to mimic the scope of this proposal (Burtraw et al. 2011).
Third,  an  EPA  regulatory  approach  probably  would  not 
provide a means to finance clean energy R&D, at least not one 
implemented or coordinated at the federal level.
Fourth, the  Clean  Air  Act  approach would  be more likely 
to  face  congressional  review  and  legal  challenge  than  the 
implementation  of  new  legislation  that  expressly  creates  a 
clean energy standard for the power sector. Finally, in the 
absence  of  new  legislation,  some  advocates  may  take  legal 
action to press EPA to employ additional provisions of the 
Clean Air Act to address greenhouse gas emissions in the 
power sector, some of which would be more costly and less 
effective than a new source performance standard approach. 
These  challenges  highlight  the  fundamental  problem  that 
Clean Air Act authority is not sufficient to drive the extent of 
clean energy deployment that is necessary, nor is it capable to 
do so as cost-effectively as would new legislation to create a 
clean energy standard.
Why  do  you  preempt  state  RPSs?  The  states  have  served 
as  very  important  laboratories  of  policy  innovation  and 
experimentation  in  the  clean  energy  space.  Once  we  have 
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2007), the complexity of the emission allocations in recent 
legislation give the appearance of rewarding specific interests 
and technologies (to at least some political observers). Third, 
the  federal  clean  energy  credit  in  this  proposal  contains 
the  costs  of  this  policy  and  thus  eliminates  much  of  the 
uncertainty and anxiety about potentially unexpected, high 
costs  associated  with  past  cap-and-trade  proposals.  This 
certainty also improves the prospects for clean energy project 
finance relative to the uncertainty associated with the impacts 
of volatile emission allowance prices on the revenue stream of a 
clean energy power plant. Fourth, this approach to promoting 
clean energy is focused on simplicity. There are no redundant 
or duplicative policies targeting power sector technologies and 
emissions under this proposal. Finally, this policy focuses on 
just the power sector and avoids the political pitfalls of raising 
the price of gasoline under an economy-wide cap-and-trade 
program.
How could this NCES transition to a more comprehensive 
energy and climate policy? As noted at the top of this paper, 
the  first-best  public  policy  to  promote  clean  energy  and 
combat climate change would be an economy-wide carbon 
tax that channels a fraction of revenues for energy R&D, and 
the balance to reducing the marginal tax rate on income or 
labor, or for deficit reduction. This NCES would be amenable 
to a transition to this first-best policy. First, the fixed profile of 
prices over time set by the federal clean energy credits would 
provide similar information for utilities’ investment planning 
as a carbon tax would. Transitioning the policy from an NCES 
to a carbon tax would not meaningfully disrupt the planning 
if the carbon tax profile follows the federal clean energy credit 
price set under the standard. Second, the implicit transfer of 
rents to the power sector through the NCES decline over time 
as the performance goals become more stringent. This would 
reduce opposition to transition from a clean energy standard 
to a carbon tax. Third, the channeling of federal clean energy 
credit revenues to the Clean Energy Fund could be transitioned 
over to a carbon tax financing scheme without much difficulty. 
The challenge, however, is to avoid the risk of policy lock-in 
and the weakening of resolve for more comprehensive policy 
down the road (Coglianese and D’Ambrosio 2008).
What  are  the  international  policy  implications  of  an 
NCES?  In  recent  years,  the  international  community  has 
paid  particular  attention  to  U.S.  domestic  climate  change 
policy. The Copenhagen Accord and the Cancun Agreements 
establish  objectives  for  U.S.  greenhouse  gas  emissions 
consistent with final energy and climate legislation as well 
as  goals  for  international  climate  financing  by  developed 
countries. An NCES would have several positive impacts on 
the international climate regime, and two potential adverse 
impacts. First, passing legislation on a clean energy standard 
would  demonstrate  a  bipartisan  effort  to  move  forward  to 
combat the challenge of climate change. Second, the emission 
reductions  that  could  be  achieved  by  this  standard,  while 
focused on just the power sector, are meaningful and, on a 
sector-specific basis, consistent with the commitments made 
in Copenhagen and Cancun. A 0.35 tCO2/MWh performance 
goal for 2020 would result in emissions in the power sector 
well below the “in the range of 17 percent below 2005 levels” 
emission  objective  submitted  by  the  United  States  under 
the Accord. Even if this performance goal is not achieved as 
power plants take advantage of federal clean energy credits, a 
conservative illustration suggests that emissions could fall 15 
percent below 2005 levels by 2020 in the power sector.
It  is  also  important  to  assess  the  comparability  of  this 
effort with the progress of major developed and developing 
countries. The International Energy Agency (IEA) publishes 
power  sector  generation  and  CO2  emission  statistics  in  its 
annual World Energy Outlook that enables comparisons of 
emission  intensity  across  major  economies  over  time  (IEA 
2007, 2010).11  In 1990, the United States and the European 
Union had equivalent emission intensities (Table 6).12  Through 
2008, the United States experienced a modest decline while 
the  EU’s  intensity  fell  by  nearly  30  percent  and  surpassed 
the carbon-lean Japanese power sector. The EU’s generation 
mix has changed significantly over the past two decades: as 
total  power  generated  increased,  coal  generation  fell  about 
10 percent as natural gas generation more than quadrupled 
and  non-hydroelectric  renewable  sources  increased  their 
generation share to more than 7 percent. Pushing toward a 
0.35  goal  for  2020  would  significantly  surpass  the  carbon 
intensity achieved to date in the EU and Japan.
An NCES could represent a significant simplification of the existing 
regulatory regime by substituting for EPA greenhouse gas emission 
regulatory authority in the power sector and existing state renewable 
and alternative energy standards. 26   Promoting Clean Energy in the American Power Sector
The NCES could also serve to illustrate a potential policy tool 
that emerging economies could employ as they reduce the 
emission intensity of their development. Both China and India 
have indicated that they intend to reduce the carbon intensity 
of their economic output. Given the very strong correlation 
between  electricity  generation  and  GDP,  a  clean  energy 
standard could be a policy instrument well-tailored to their 
climate goals. In addition, advancing a clean energy standard 
in the United States may enable the U.S. to press for more-
aggressive energy and climate policies by China and India.
An NCES based on an intensity performance metric, however, 
may complicate efforts to integrate U.S. energy and climate 
policy with the EU Emission Trading Scheme (Jaffe, Ranson, 
and Stavins 2010; Metcalf and Weisbach 2010). Linking a clean 
energy standard to the EU’s cap-and-trade program would 
increase emission uncertainty in Europe because of both the 
intensity measure and the federal clean energy credit in the 
NCES. In effect, linking would result in the EU having a price 
ceiling determined by the U.S. federal clean energy credit price 
schedule, and it may not be likely that the Europeans would 
choose to link the systems, given this potential outcome.
TABLE 6
Electricity Generation CO2 Emission Intensity, Select Countries, 1990, 2005, 2008
Country or region   1990  2005  2008
United States  0.58  0.58  0.55
European Union  0.58  0.43  0.41
Japan  0.43  0.42  0.44
China  1.00  0.98  0.90
India  0.85  0.94  0.97
Source: Constructed from data presented in IEA (2007, 2010).
Related to this trading point, a clean energy standard would 
not deliver private market incentives for international climate 
finance. The Copenhagen Accord and the Cancun Agreements 
envision  a  significant  ramping  up  of  international  climate 
finance  to  facilitate  adaptation,  slow  deforestation,  and 
promote clean energy technology deployment in developing 
countries. The scale called for in the Accord and Agreements 
is  feasible  only  with  a  very  robust  system  of  international 
emission  trading.  The  proposed  NCES  would  not  serve 
as  the  necessary  foundation  for  such  an  enhancement  of 
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Conclusion
A
n  NCES  would  address  the  need  and  interest  to 
advance U.S. energy policy. The NCES would establish 
a level playing field for power generation technologies 
through  a  technology-neutral  approach  to  promoting  clean 
energy  deployment.  All  efforts  to  reduce  the  pollution-
intensity  of  electricity,  from  wind  and  solar  to  improved 
combustion  efficiency  and  carbon  capture  and  storage  at 
coal-fired power plants, would be rewarded. The NCES would 
provide  a  transparent,  nonvolatile  price  incentive  that  will 
facilitate clean energy deployment. This certainty also ensures 
that any economic or technological surprises do not result in 
unexpectedly high electricity rates.
This  technology-neutral  approach  with  price  certainty  will 
enable the American economy to get the biggest bang for its 
buck in terms of clean energy deployment. As the analysis in 
this paper indicates, this approach is not free, but no serious 
effort  to  advance  U.S.  energy  policy  can  be  done  on  the 
cheap if it is to meaningfully improve our energy economy. 
Nonetheless, the costs are modest—the maximum possible 
nationwide  electricity  rate  impact  would  be  about  0.3¢/
kWh, and under this proposed policy about two-thirds of the 
nation would still face lower electricity prices in 2015 than 
they experienced in recent years. The benefits to the whole of 
American society clearly exceed the modest costs of an NCES.
An NCES represents a simple, transparent, more cost-effective, 
and more effective alternative to greenhouse gas regulatory 
authority  under  the  Clean  Air  Act  and  the  patchwork  of 
state  renewable  and  alternative  energy  portfolio  standards. 
Pursuing the proposed clean energy policy to substitute for 
the  Clean  Air  Act  authority  and  the  various  state  policies 
would  streamline  power  plants’  regulatory  environment 
and reduce their administrative burden. In addition, a clean 
energy  standard  would  deliver  a  long-term  price  incentive 
for clean energy that would replicate the current benefits of 
renewable  production  tax  credits  without  the  requirement 
of budget outlays. Given the current fiscal environment, the 
opportunity to raise revenue to fund energy R&D and enable 
deficit reduction and tax cuts also makes this standard more 
appealing than the status quo federal and state policies.
Although  an  NCES  could  promote  significant  deployment 
of clean energy and finance necessary energy R&D, it is not 
sufficient  to  transform  the  American  energy  system  and 
combat climate change. The United States will need to identify 
and  pursue  energy  and  climate  policy  beyond  the  power 
sector. An NCES could serve as the starting point for a more 
efficient, long-term, comprehensive policy, such as a carbon 
tax that would also deliver significant fiscal or tax reduction 
benefits, or both.28   Promoting Clean Energy in the American Power Sector
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Endnotes
1.	 Refer	to	Freed,	Horwitz,	and	Cunningham	(2011)	for	further	discus-
sion	of	bipartisan	interest	in	a	clean	energy	standard.
2.	 The	manufacturing	of	parts	and	construction	of	nuclear	power	plants,	
wind	farms,	solar	farms,	and	so	on	has	associated	CO2	emissions.	This	
analysis	focuses	on	emissions	at	the	time	of	power	generation	and	does	
not	attempt	to	assess	life-cycle	CO2	emissions	by	generation	technol-
ogy.
3.	 There	are	potentially	meaningful	benefits	to	displacing	oil	consump-
tion	through	the	electrification	of	the	transportation	sector	with	elec-
tric	vehicles.	
4.	 Michel	(2011)	describes	an	alternative	approach	in	which	the	point	of	
regulation	would	be	at	local	distribution	companies	that	would	not	re-
quire	the	tracking	of	the	electricity’s	emission	characteristics	back	to	the	
generation	unit.
5.	 See,	e.g.,	American	Energy	Innovation	Council	(AEIC)	2010;	Green-
stone	2010;	Hayward,	Muro,	Nordhaus,	Shellenberger	2010;	and	Presi-
dent’s	Council	of	Advisors	on	Science	and	Technology	(PCAST)	2010	
for	more	details	on	need	for	and	targeting	of	energy	R&D	funding.
6.	 The	EIA	(2011a)	presents	price	data	for	twenty-two	electricity	markets	
that	cover	the	entire	continental	United	States.	For	this	analysis,	I	have	
combined	the	three	New	York	markets	(NYCW,	NYLI,	NYUP)	into	
one	statewide	New	York	market.	I	have	not	extended	the	analysis	to	
Alaska	or	Hawai`i	due	to	lack	of	forecast	electricity	prices	(in	the	ab-
sence	of	a	NCES)	for	these	markets.
7.	 The	percentage	increase	for	the	industrial	sector	is	greater	than	for	the	
national	average	because	industrial	electricity	rates	are	45	percent	lower	
than	residential	rates.
8.	 For	evidence	of	this,	refer	to	Metcalf	(2009)	for	an	assessment	of	the	
adverse	impact	occasional	lapses	in	the	renewable	production	tax	credit	
has	had	on	U.S.	wind	investment.
9.	 A	renewable-only	policy,	such	as	a	national	renewable	portfolio	stan-
dard,	would	likely	displace	the	use	of	natural	gas	in	the	U.S.	power	sec-
tor,	at	least	in	the	near	term	(MIT	Energy	Initiative	2010).
10.	Thanks	to	Dallas	Burtraw	and	Nathan	Richardson	for	several	produc-
tive	conversations	on	the	use	of	regulatory	authority	under	the	Clean	
Air	Act.		Any	remaining	errors	in	interpretation	of	the	Clean	Air	Act	are	
solely	those	of	the	author.
11.	The	IEA’s	published	data	yield	emission	intensity	values	for	the	United	
States	lower	than	those	derived	from	EIA	published	data.	To	ensure	
consistency	in	source	data	and	methods	across	countries,	this	compari-
son	uses	the	IEA	data	for	the	United	States	instead	of	the	EIA	data	
presented	in	Figure	1.
12.	All	EU	statistics	are	constructed	based	on	the	current	twenty-seven	
member	states.	30   Promoting Clean Energy in the American Power Sector
References
Aldy, Joseph E., and William A. Pizer. 2009 (May). “The    
    Competitiveness Impacts of Climate Change Mitigation 
Policies.” Arlington, VA: Pew Center on Global Climate 
Change. http://www.pewclimate.org/docUploads/
competitiveness-impacts-report.pdf
American Energy Innovation Council (AEIC). 2010. “A Business  
    Plan for America’s Energy Future.” http://www.
americanenergyinnovation.org/full-report
American Wind Energy Association (AWEA). 2011 (January 24).  
    “Wind Industry Finishes 2010 with Half the Installations 
of 2009, Activity Up in 2011, Now Cost-Competitive with 
Natural Gas.” Press Release. Accessed at http://www.awea.org/
newsroom/pressreleases/release_01-24-11.cfm
Burtraw, Dallas, Arthur G. Fraas, and Nathan Richardson. 2011.  
    “Greenhouse Gas Regulation Under the Clean Air Act: A 
Guide for Economists.” Discussion Paper 11-08. Resources for 
the Future, Washington, DC.
Coglianese, Cary, and Jocelyn D’Ambrosio. 2008. “Policymaking  
    Under Pressure: The Perils of Incremental Responses to 
Climate Change.” Connecticut Law Review 40(5): 1411–1429.
Deutch, John. 2011. “An Energy Technology Corporation    
      Will Improve the Federal Government’s Efforts to Accelerate 
Energy Innovation.” prepared for The Hamilton Project.
Energy Information Administration (EIA). 2010a. “Annual Energy  
    Review 2010.” Washington, DC: Department of Energy.
Energy Information Administration (EIA). 2010b. “Energy Market  
    and Economic Impacts of the American Power Act of 2010.” 
SR/OIAF/2010-01. Washington, DC: Department of Energy.
Energy Information Administration (EIA). 2011a. “Annual Energy  
    Outlook 2011.” Washington, DC: Department of Energy.
Energy Information Administration (EIA). 2011b (March). “Short- 
    Term Energy Outlook.” Washington, DC: Department of 
Energy.
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 2011a. “Environmental  
    Protection Agency 40 CFR Parts 60 and 63.” Accessed at http://
www.epa.gov/airquality/powerplanttoxics/pdfs/proposal.pdf
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 2011b (March). “PSD  
    and Title V Permitting Guidance for Greenhouse Gases.” 
Research Triangle Park, NC: OAQPS/EPA.
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). Federal Register. 2007  
    (June 13). “Standards of Performance for Fossil-   
  Fuel-Fired Steam Generators for Which Construction Is 
Commenced After August 17, 1971; Standards of Performance 
for Electric Utility Steam Generating Units for Which 
Construction Is Commenced After September 18, 1978; 
Standards of Performance for Industrial-Commercial-
Institutional Steam Generating Units; and Standards of 
Performance for Small Industrial-Commercial-Institutional 
Steam Generating Units.” 72(113): 32710. Government 
Printing Office, Washington, DC. Accessed at http://www.gpo.
gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2007-06-13/pdf/E7-7673.pdf
Fischer, Carolyn. 2010. “Renewable Portfolio Standards: When Do  
    They Lower Energy Prices?” The Energy Journal 31(1): 101–119.
Fischer, Carolyn, and Richard G. Newell. 2008. “Environmental  
    and Technology Policies for Climate Mitigation.” Journal of 
Environmental Economics and Management 55: 142–162.
Freed, Joshua, Elizabeth Horwitz, and Nicholas Cunningham. 2011  
    (March). “A Clean Energy Standard: Getting the United States 
Back into the Clean Energy Race.” Policy Memo, Third Way. 
Washington, DC.
Government of Alberta. 2010 (May 5). “Alberta Leads with Actions,  
    Results for Clean Energy Future.” News release. http://
alberta.ca/acn/201005/2828769B3F377-C6CA-67C5-
3A4E14BA6B25EA72.html
Greenstone, Michael. 2010 (July 27). “The Importance of R&D  
    for U.S. Competitiveness and Clean Energy Future.” 
Testimony before the Joint Economic Committee. http://www.
brookings.edu/testimony/2010/0727_greenstone_energy.aspx
Goulder, Lawrence H., and Robert N. Stavins. Forthcoming.   
      “Challenges from State-Federal Interactions in U.S. Climate 
Change Policy.” American Economic Review, Papers and 
Proceedings.
Hahn, Robert W. and Robert N. Stavins. Forthcoming. “The Effect  
    of Allowance Allocations on Cap-and-Trade System 
Performance.” Journal of Law and Economics.
Hayward, Steven F., Mark Muro, Ted Nordhaus, and Michael  
    Shellenberger. 2010. “Post-Partisan Power: How a Limited 
and Direct Approach to Energy Innovation Can Deliver 
Clean, Cheap Energy, Economic Productivity, and 
National Prosperity.” American Enterprise Institute, 
Brookings Institution, and Breakthrough Institute. http://
thebreakthrough.org/blog/2010/10/postpartisan_power.shtml
Interagency Working Group on Social Cost of Carbon, United States  
    Government. 2010. “Technical Support Document: Social Cost 
of Carbon for Regulatory Impact Analysis Under Executive 
Order 12866.” Washington, DC: United States Government.
International Energy Agency (IEA). 2007. World Energy Outlook  
    2007. Paris: IEA.
International Energy Agency (IEA). 2010. World Energy Outlook  
    2010. Paris: IEA.
Jaffe, Judson, Matthew Ranson, and Robert N. Stavins. 2010. “Linking  
    Tradable Permit Systems: A Key Element of Emerging 
International Climate Policy Architecture.” Ecology Law 
Quarterly 36: 789–808.The Hamilton Project  •  Brookings   31
Kaplan, Stan Mark. 2010 (January 19). “Displacing Coal with  
    Generation from Existing Natural Gas-Fired Power Plants.” 
Congressional Research Service, Washington, DC.
Kerr, Suzi, and Richard G. Newell. 2003. “Policy-Induced Technology  
    Adoption: Evidence from the U.S. Lead Phasedown.” Journal 
of Industrial Economics 51(3): 317–343.
Metcalf, Gilbert E. 2009. “Investment in Energy Infrastructure and  
    the Tax Code.” Working Paper 15429. National Bureau of 
Economic Research, Cambridge, MA.
Metcalf, Gilbert E. and David Weisbach. 2010 (July). “Linking Policies  
    When Tastes Differ: Global Climate Policy in a Heterogeneous 
World.” Discussion Paper 10-38, Harvard Project on 
International Climate Agreements, Cambridge, MA.
Michel, Steven. 2011. “A Model Clean Energy Standard.” The   
    Electricity Journal 24(3): 45–51.
MIT Energy Initiative. 2010. “The Future of Natural Gas: An   
    Interdisciplinary MIT Study, Interim Report.” Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA.
North Carolina Solar Center and Interstate Renewable Energy  
    Council (IREC). n.d. “Database of State Incentives for 
Renewables and Efficiency.” Accessed at http://www.dsireusa.
org/documents/summarymaps/RPS_map.pptx.
President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology (PCAST).  
    2010 (November). “Report to the President on Accelerating the 
Pace of Change in Energy Technologies Through an Integrated 
Federal Energy Policy.”Executive Office of the President, 
Washington, DC.
Stavins, Robert N. 2007. “A U.S. Cap-and-Trade System to Address  
    Global Climate Change.” Discussion Paper 2007-13. The 
Hamilton Project, Washington, DC.
Stavins, Robert N. 2010 (October 21). “Both Are Necessary, but  
    Neither Is Sufficient: Carbon-Pricing and Technology R&D 
Initiatives in a Meaningful National Climate Policy.” An 
Economic View of the Environment blog. Accessed at http://
belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/analysis/stavins/
U.S. Senate. n.d. “Clean Energy Standard White Paper.”  
  Accessed at http://energy.senate.gov/public/index. 
    cfm?FuseAction=IssueItems.View&IssueItem_ID=7b61e406-
3e17-4927-b3f4-d909394d46de
Wiser, Ryan, Christopher Namovicz, Mark Gielicki, and Robert  
    Smith. 2007. “Renewables Portfolio Standards: A Factual 
Introduction to Experience from the United States.” Working 
Paper LBNL-62569. Ernest Orlando Lawrence Berkeley 
National Laboratory, Berkeley, CAGEORGE A. AKERLOF
Koshland Professor of Economics
University of California at Berkeley
ROGER C. ALTMAN
Founder & Chairman
Evercore Partners
HOWARD P. BERKOWITZ
Managing Director
BlackRock
ALAN S. BLINDER
Gordon S. Rentschler Memorial Professor 
of Economics & Public Affairs
Princeton University
TIMOTHY C. COLLINS
Senior Managing Director  
& Chief Executive Officer 
Ripplewood Holding, LLC
ROBERT CUMBY
Professor of Economics
Georgetown University
JOHN DEUTCH
Institute Professor
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
KAREN DYNAN
Vice President & Co-Director 
of Economic Studies
Senior Fellow, The Brookings Institution
CHRISTOPHER EDLEY, JR.
Dean and Professor, Boalt School of Law
University of California, Berkeley
MEEGHAN PRUNTY EDELSTEIN
Senior Advisor
The Hamilton Project
BLAIR W. EFFRON
Founding Partner
Centerview Partners LLC
JUDY FEDER
Professor of Public Policy 
Georgetown University 
Senior Fellow, Center for American Progress
ROLAND FRYER
Robert M. Beren Professor of Economics
Harvard University and CEO, EdLabs
ADVISORY COUNCIL
MARK GALLOGLY
Managing Principal
Centerbridge Partners
TED GAYER
Senior Fellow & Co-Director 
of Economic Studies
The Brookings Institution
RICHARD GEPHARDT
President & Chief Executive Officer
Gephardt Government Affairs 
MICHAEL D. GRANOFF
Chief Executive Officer
Pomona Capital
ROBERT GREENSTEIN
Executive Director
Center on Budget and Policy Priorities
CHUCK HAGEL 
Distinguished Professor 
Georgetown University
Former U.S. Senator
GLENN H. HUTCHINS
Co-Founder and Co-Chief Executive
Silver Lake
JIM JOHNSON
Vice Chairman
Perseus LLC  
LAWRENCE KATZ
Elisabeth Allison Professor of Economics
Harvard University
MARK MCKINNON
Vice Chairman
Public Strategies, Inc.
ERIC MINDICH
Chief Executive Officer
Eton Park Capital Management
SUZANNE NORA JOHNSON
Former Vice Chairman
Goldman Sachs Group, Inc.
PETER ORSZAG
Vice Chairman of Global Banking
Citigroup, Inc.
RICHARD PERRY
Chief Executive Officer
Perry Capital
PENNY PRITZKER
Chairman of the Board
TransUnion
ROBERT REISCHAUER
President
The Urban Institute
ALICE RIVLIN
Senior Fellow & Director 
Greater Washington Research at Brookings 
Professor of Public Policy 
Georgetown University 
ROBERT E. RUBIN
Co-Chair, Council on Foreign Relations
Former U.S. Treasury Secretary
DAVID RUBENSTEIN 
Co-Founder & Managing Director
The Carlyle Group
LESLIE B. SAMUELS
Partner
Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP
RALPH L. SCHLOSSTEIN
President & Chief Executive Officer
Evercore Partners
ERIC SCHMIDT
Chairman & CEO
Google Inc.
ERIC SCHWARTZ
76 West Holdings
THOMAS F. STEYER
Senior Managing Member
Farallon Capital Management, L.L.C.
LAWRENCE H. SUMMERS
Charles W. Eliot University Professor 
Harvard University
LAURA D’ANDREA TYSON
S.K. and Angela Chan Professor of 
Global Management, Haas School of 
Business University of California, Berkeley
MICHAEL GREENSTONE
DirectorW W W . H A M I LT O N P R O J E C T. O R G
W W W . H A M I LT O N P R O J E C T. O R G
1775 Massachusetts Ave., NW 
Washington, DC 20036
(202) 797-6279
Printed on recycled paper.
Highlights
Joseph Aldy of the Harvard Kennedy School of Government 
proposes the establishment of a National Clean Energy 
Standard (NCES) that applies to the U.S. power sector.
The Proposal
A technology-neutral, emission intensity-based 
standard. There are many ways to define “clean energy.” 
A technology-neutral approach based on emission intensity 
would enable all sources in our current energy mix to 
contribute towards meeting the standard. It also would keep 
government focused on the bottom line—environmental 
outcomes—instead of on picking winners and losers. 
Tradable clean energy credits. Power plants would be 
able to trade clean energy credits. Clean facilities that beat 
the standard generate credits than can be sold to less-clean 
facilities that fail to meet the emission-intensity performance 
goal. If the price of credits exceeds a preset level, power 
plants would be able to buy credits from the federal 
government.  
A Clean Energy Fund. Revenue raised under the 
standard would go towards a Clean Energy Fund that would 
support energy innovation through R&D and technology 
demonstration. About $2 billion in revenues would be  
initially dedicated in 2015, ramping up to $5 billion in 2025.
Benefits
The National Clean Energy Standard Aldy proposes would 
significantly reduce CO2 emissions in the power sector, 
streamline the existing regulatory framework, fund energy 
innovation, and serve as a bridge to a more comprehensive 
economy-wide carbon pricing system. 